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This chapter is an empirical study of the growth and change in the Cambridge high technology 
cluster.  Cambridge shows the paradoxical co-existence of vastly smaller scale outcomes but many 
qualitative similarities to Silicon Valley.  Our main questions from the empirical enquiry in this 
chapter are broad:  First, how has the Cambridge hi-technology cluster changed and grown 
overtime?  Secondly, we are interested in what sorts of microeconomic factors explain these bigger 
changes.  With an understanding of these two questions we draw some implications of the 
Cambridge story for our understanding of what kinds of agglomeration economies and externalities 
were important to the growth of the Cambridge cluster.  The failure of Cambridge to globalise to 
the same degree as Silicon Valley, we argue, accounts for the dissimilarities in the two experiences. 
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AGGLOMERATION AND GROWTH: A STUDY OF THE CAMBRIDGE HI-TECH CLUSTER 
1. The Cambridge phenomenon:  Is it Silicon Fen? 
The “Cambridge Phenomenon” was a term coined by Segal, Quince and Wicksteed  (SQW) 
in 1986 to describe the mushrooming of over 300 high technology firms in the Cambridge area, 
after the Cambridge Science Park received its first occupant in 1976.  This number has increased 
steadily through the decade of the nineties and had more than tripled in 1999.  By the end of 1999, 
the number of hi-tech establishments had grown to 959 in all employing over 31,000 people.  In 
terms of its economic impact on the region, the Cambridge area accounted for 60% of all hi-tech 
establishments and over 70% of all hi-tech employment in Cambridgeshire County.   
Cambridge has also developed an array of institutions, university-industry links and local 
technology venture capital that have favoured and sought to nurture entrepreneurship in science 
based industries.  In these institutional developments, Cambridge is unique of all the other IT 
clusters that followed in the wake of Silicon Valley’s success.  No other European region has 
shown the s ame scale of entrepreneurial activity in science-based sectors as Cambridge or can 
boast the emergence of similar institutions without any state intervention.  Furthermore the 
University of Cambridge has been a key player in these institutional developments.  These 
qualitative features of the growth of Cambridge have prompted several comparisons with Silicon 
Valley. 
Despite these similarities, growth and change within the Cambridge cluster has not produced 
the same sort of economic outcomes as Silicon Valley.  The differences that stand out most 
markedly are the smaller scale of Cambridge (whether measured by population size or regional 
GDP) and the absence of large firms based on product market successes.  Estimates suggest that 
though Cambridgeshire County and Silicon Valley (Santa Clara county) encompass a similar 
geographical area, their economic scale is vastly different.1  Thus Cambridgeshire County (without 
Peterborough) has a population of 543,000 compared with 1.6 million people in Silicon Valley.    2
Average earnings are £20,000 in contrast with £31,000 in Silicon Valley.  Most tellingly, the 
regional GDP of the Silicon Valley at £42 million is 6 times that of Cambridgeshire County. 
A second difference in economic outcomes is that Cambridge has not produced a large 
number of outstandingly successful firms that have grown to large sizes in the manner of Silicon 
Valley successes like Hewlett Packard or Intel.  This has not changed very much in the recent past.  
Though there are impressive stock market successes the average rate of growth for Cambridge 
firms continues to be low, and the faster growing firms have not shown a great growth of 
employment.    As we show later in the paper, the growth of employment in the area comes 
predominantly from the growth in the numbers of establishments.  
Lastly, unlike Silicon Valley the Cambridge area is not regionally specialised in hi-technology 
production in the UK.  Regional specialisation is inferred from the higher than average proportion 
of employment in any industry or group of industries, with the average being defined by the 
national average.  Recent computations of relative specialisation indices of different UK regions in 
knowledge based businesses2 by Huggins (2000) shows that Cambridge showed roughly the same 
proportion of knowledge-based businesses as the UK average: thus, Cambridgeshire county shows 
a specialisation index of 105.5 and is ranked 20th among UK regions with high values for 
specialisation in knowledge based services.   The areas that were regionally specialised in 
knowledge based businesses lay around London, and included areas like Bracknell, Wokingham, 
Surrey, and Reading.  An earlier estimate by Begg (1991) covering the 1981-89, showed that 
Cambridge ranked 18th among UK urban areas that were relatively specialised in hi-technology 
activity.3  The regions ranked higher than Cambridge included Bracknell, Stevenage, and Welwyn – 
all areas that lay outside London. 
 Thus, while Cambridge has succeeded in getting a significant amount of science-based 
entrepreneurship, some local network effects among the scientists, there is not much in the way of 
success in a firm-growth sense or even in the number of firms to start making a big national   3
contribution, as is confirmed by regional specialisation indices.   This paradox of vastly smaller 
scale outcomes but qualitative similarities frames the study of growth and change in the Cambridge 
hi-tech cluster in this chapter.  
In this chapter, we define the Cambridge area as comprising Cambridge City, South 
Cambridgeshire district, East Cambridgeshire and the Fenlands area.4   Our main questions from 
the empirical enquiry are broad:  First, how has the Cambridge hi-technology 5 cluster changed and 
grown overtime?  This is specially interesting when we consider that compared with all the other 
clusters studied in this book, Cambridge has been recognised as a cluster for the longest.   
Secondly, we are interested in what sorts of microeconomic factors explain these bigger changes.  
With an understanding of these two questions we draw some implications of the Cambridge story 
for our understanding of agglomeration economies and externalities in the growth of clusters.  The 
chapter is empirical and draws on two main sources of data, which are detailed in Appendix 1.   
The remainder of the chapter is organized in the following way:  Section 2 describes the 
features of change and growth of the Cambridge hi-tech cluster between 1988-2000.  Section 3 
highlights the main microeconomic processes that appear to lie behind these changes.  Section 4 
examines the some implications of these dynamics – particularly the relative unimportance of 
Marshallian agglomeration economies, but the importance of the mobility of personnel and small 
Olsonian groups that have played a crucial role in linking university and industry and in the 
development of institutions to nurture entrepreneurship.  Section 5 concludes with some lessons 
that comparing Cambridge with Silicon Valley allows us to draw. 
2.  Growth and change in the Cambridge hi-tech cluster 
  2.1:  Growth in the Cambridge area 
Figures 1 and 2 document the growth in numbers of firms and in employment in the 
Cambridge area. In the absence of data on the value of sales of firms, we rely upon the growth in   4
employment to give us a measure of growth for the region as a whole.  The growth of employment 
and establishments shows a steady rather than explosive growth.   
{Figure 1 & 2 here} 
Decomposing the changes in the stock of firms over the period 1988-98 into gains and losses 
due to various reasons as shown in Table 1 reveals that it is the high rate of new firm formation 
that has sustained the gains in the stock of firms since 1988.  This is not a new trend. Keeble 
(1988) showed that rates of new firm formation in the Cambridge area had consistently been far 
above national averages even in earlier periods. 
 (Table 1 here) 
The category of new firms in Table 1 does not distinguish between indigenous new firms and 
firms from outside that are moving into Cambridge.   Other studies however have shown that the 
proportion of independent firms in the region is remarkably high.  Thus, SQW in 1986 estimated 
that 75% of firms were independent and later estimates by Garnsey put this figure at 66%.  Thus, 
it is the independent start-ups of new firms, rather than the set-up of branch plants of national 
firms or subsidiaries of large international firms, which explain the high rates of new firm formation 
in the Cambridge area.   
The proportion of firms that emerged as new start-up, or as a spin-off from other firms, in 
the Cambridge area has increased overtime (Table 2a).  This proportion was high at 73% in SQW’s 
1984 study, and the later SQW (1998) puts this figure at a higher 79%, but the CBR (1996) study 
found the proportion of new firms and start-ups to be even higher (88%).     
{Table 2a-c here} 
The more interesting aspect of new firm formation revealed by the CBR survey is that more 
than one third of these new firms were spin-offs from other firms and the University.  The SQW   5
study had noted that about two-thirds of all hi-tech businesses (244 out of a total of 355 known 
firms) were interconnected.  This is strikingly evident in their “family tree” of enterprises. The 
CBR survey does not draw a similar family tree but reveals nonetheless that linkages between firms 
due to common origins are very prevalent.  Thus they show that an overwhelmingly large 
proportion of the founders of new companies (start-ups and spin offs) come from local firms, 
followed by University departments (Table 2b).  Further, nearly half the surveyed local firms report 
staff leaving to set up a new firms (Table 2c) and a large majority of the “parent” firms had formal 
and informal links with firms so set up.   
2.2   The growth of firms  
The region does not boast of a large number of outstandingly successful firms that grew to 
large sizes.  Even now, though there are firms that have a high stock market capitalisation, firms 
that a large sized are few.  Thus, the size distribution of firms reported in Table 3 reveals very 
small numbers of large firms.  In part this could be explained by the large presence of service firms 
or consultancies (where 50 employees indicate a reasonably large size) but the slow growth of 
firms is undoubtedly a factor. 
{Table 3 here} 
Gonzalez  -Benito et al (1997) showed that the growth of sales varied across industrial 
sectors and years, but was about 5.5 % per annum for firms in the region.6  Their figures are 
reported in Table 4.  The trends for 1988-96 also show that the recession of 1991 hit most firms 
and average rates of growth fell between 1991-93.   
{Table 4 here} 
Despite the preponderance of small firms computations suggest that the rate of failure 
amongst small hi-tech firms in Cambridge was low.  Table 5 suggests a ratio of firm closure to new   6
firms close to 1 for South Cambridgeshire but about 0.5 for Cambridge city.  It is a ratio that 
appears to increase through time, but surprisingly falls in the recession years of 1991-93 for both 
Cambridge city and South Cambridgeshire. 
{Table 5 here} 
2.3:   Industrial diversity and change in the bases of growth 
The region retains an industrial diversity. This in turn is probably related to the fact that its 
industrial production comprises intermediate rather than final goods.  Table 6 shows that the two 
big sub-regions of Cambridge city and South Cambridgeshire show different but related 
specialisations.  While R&D strengths are common to both regions, manufacturing and engineering 
are South Cambridgeshire strengths, while computer services and telecommunications seem to be 
strengths of the Cambridge city firms.  Together South Cambridgeshire and Cambridge city show a 
functional specialisation of the region around generic R&D strengths in new technologies that 
could be spread over a large number of industrial sectors. 
{Table 6 here}  
The industrial composition of the cluster also changed in the late 80s, and the relative 
concentrations of employment in instrumentation and electrical and electronic engineering have 
been replaced over time by a concentration in R&D services,  computer services and 
telecommunications.  The last decade has also seen the growth in importance of biotechnology 
firms in numbers of establishments and in employment.  It is estimated that employment in 
biotechnology (in the Cambridge area) grew rapidly from 4819 employees in 1990 to over 8,000 
employees at the end of 1999.  Biotech firms are also increasingly concentrated in the Cambridge 
area of Cambridgeshire county: at the end of 1999 the Cambridge area accounted for just under 
90% of total biotech employment in Cambridgeshire county.7    7
A diversified industrial base has also contributed to maintaining a steady growth of 
employment in hi-tech industry in the Cambridge region.  As noted earlier the gains in employment 
between 1988-97 were largely due the setting up of new establishments.  These gains are 
concentrated in computer services, telecommunications and R&D services and have more than 
offset the losses in employment, which have been concentrated Instrument and Electronic and 
electrical engineering.8    The R&D sector has continued to be a major source of employment gains 
amidst the shifting specialisation from related manufacturing sectors to the service-intensive 
sectors of telecommunications and software. 
These changes in the industrial bases of growth mask an underlying continuity in functional 
specialisation. Cambridge has always had strong R&D strengths that earlier drove the scientific 
instrumentation and a less successful electronics industry in the region in the late 70s and early 
80s.   These strengths have in recent years been leveraged in R&D services and consultancy 
services. 
2.4 Institutional developments 
The period since the late 80s has been marked by a growing thickness of institutions in the 
Cambridge area.  Activities like corporate venturing which were earlier carried out within 
particular firms now spawn a separate and specialised economic activity, viz. local technology 
venture capital firms.  Another development has been the more institutionalised relationships 
between the University research and industry on one hand, and the involvement of the university 
and local administration in providing a congenial environment for the growth of hi-technology 
firms, on the other.   
These developments have also imparted the Cambridge region with an image of a place that 
is outward looking and ready for change - thus adding to its reputation and credibility as a hi-  8
technology centre - an image that in turn, has some force in attracting new hi-technology 
businesses to locate in the Cambridge region. 
2.4.1 Corporate venturing and technology venture capital 
Cambridge firms like Cambridge Consultants Ltd. had started corporate venturing activities 
as early as 1984, though in those days its activities were not termed as corporate venturing.  In 
their report, SQW (1986: 18) note that CCL had always encouraged their employees to do their 
own thing making it a prolific source of spinout companies.  These companies were assisted in a 
variety of ways including commercialisation of technological ideas and finance being provided in 
return for license fees, royalties or equity participation.  A notable feature of the late 80s has 
been the involvement of employees from Cambridge firms, and sometimes entrepreneurs from 
the earlier generation in managing venture capital funds that have flowed into Cambridge.   
There are several prominent examples of this.  The directors involved with Cambridge 
Consultants have set up other successful venture capital firms: Robert Hook went on to set up 
Prelude Technology Investments in 1984 and Gordon Edge (also from CCL) went on to set up 
Generics Asset Management Ltd. in 1987.   Sinclair Research, another entrepreneurial start-up of 
the 1980s, which also had strong business links with Cambridge Consultants, brought John Lee to 
Cambridge.  John Lee stayed on as a business angel and was involved in several prominent start-
ups such as Xaar, Cantab Pharma, and Ionica.  He became Chariman of the Cambridge Quantum 
Fund, established in 1990 with investment from the University of Cambridge and 3i Plc.   In Jan 
2000 he set up Odessey- a new venture capital fund.  Similarly, one of the founders of Acorn, 
Hermann Hauser has been involved in the set-up of Amadeus, a venture capital fund with has 
capital from Microsoft.  Another successful entrepreneur managing venture capital funds is Chris 
Evans, founder of Chiroscience, who has been a key person in the setting up of the new Gateway 
venture capital fund in 1999 and plans to bring his own biotechnology venture capital firm, 
Merlin Ventures from London to Cambridge.   9
It is estimated that the known venture capital funding in Cambridge exceeds £300 million.9 
The proportion of applications funded by venture capital firms is however small (~4%) in 
comparison to the applications made to them.  Still there are signs that a virtuous circle is 
emerging.  Not only have local venture capital firms emerged and benefited from the 
management expertise of some of the prominent entrepreneurs from the region, the presence of 
local venture capital firms also help the emergence of new technology based enterprises in the 
region.  Thus, Lumme et al (1994) estimated that a larger proportion of Cambridge technology-
based firms (19-21% of all firms) drew their initial capital from venture capital when compared to 
their Finnish counterparts, where only 3% of all firms resorted to venture capital as a source of 
start-up capital.  Similarly, Keeble et al (1999: 329) based upon the CBR survey reported that 
20% of the surveyed firms had used local venture capital and two-thirds of those had used local 
venture capital for more than 50% of their capital needs.     
2.4.2  University-industry links 
The period since 1986 has also seen the prominent growth of industry-university linkages 
through a variety of means.  Both the involvement of Cambridge alumni, and the beneficial effect 
of the setting up of some important public sector research centres have been crucial to the 
development of these linkages.  New research labs have been funded in collaboration with some 
large national and international firms.  These have often been inter-disciplinary in nature- itself a 
recognition of the University’s uniformly good strengths in several of its departments. 
The first such collaboration was the setting up of the Olivetti and Oracle research laboratory 
by Dr. Andy Hopper, who had completed his Ph.D with Profs. Wilkes and Wheeler at the 
Computer laboratory in Cambridge.  This research lab has spun out companies like Virata, 
Telemedia, and Adaptive Broadband.  The lab has in 1999 been taken over by AT&T.  The 
success of the CAD centre, set up as a public sector research lab in 1964, but privatised in 1983, 
no doubt inspired this venture.   The University has also benefited from public sector research   10
laboratories such as the medical research centre (MRC), and more recently the establishment of 
the Sanger Research Centre and the Human Genome project just outside of Cambridge in 1996.    
The spring and summer of 1998 saw a spate of research collaborations. Unilever gave £13 
million to the department of Chemistry for the setting up of a new Centre for Molecular Science 
Informatics; British Petroleum gave the University £21 million to set up an interdisciplinary 
centre to create a focus for research on multiphase fluid flow; Bill Gates donated £12 million to 
set up a computer laboratory; Hutchinson Whompoa gave £5 million to fund a research centre 
which would comprise a unit for cancer research and another in molecular and cellular biology.  
In  March 2000 this year Marconi donated £40 million towards a the setting up of the a telecom 
research centre to develop new technology for internet and data transmission.10  Leading firms in 
all three of the major industries of the region have now invested in research in the University. 
 There have also been other institutional developments to strengthen university-industry 
links in 1997-98.  Hermann Hauser and David Cleevely have been instrumental in setting up the 
Cambridge Network to raise global profile and increase local networking by Cambridge IT firms.  
The Network has set up a website Cambridge Connect (modelled along the lines of San Diego 
connect) which aims to publicise the business support facilities available for the Cambridge 
region.  St. John’s Innovation Centre on the science park has been set up to provide incubation 
and support facilities for technology hi-technology firms. There are also plans to add a bioscience 
park to the St. John’s Science Park, and to set up another new Science park for biotechnology at 
Hinxton Hall near the Sanger Centre/Wellcome Trust.  
Cambridge Futures, an academic and business alliance has been set up with private sector 
funding to explore different scenarios for accommodating anticipated growth in the region. The 
Greater Cambridge Partnership was established in 1998 to develop a consensus between local 
business, government (county and districts) and the university on the future of economic strategy 
for the Cambridge region.  Firms in the region wishing to expand face numerous difficulties due   11
to traffic congestion and the non-availability of land for industrial expansion.  As the major 
landlord in the region, the cooperation of the University and its Colleges are key to the region’s 
development.   
3 Explaining changes in the region: some microeconomic forces 
In this section we try to assess what lies behind some of the main changes outlined in Section 
2:  why has there been so much start-up activity, why the shift in the industrial base towards high 
technology services, and why the slower growth of firms in Cambridge?  We also argue that some 
of these changes are linked. 
3.1 The emergence and location of new firms in the Cambridge area 
The strongly local character of new firm formation revealed earlier in Table 2b begs the 
question of motives.  What sorts of factors favour entrepreneurial activity in the Cambridge area?  
A number of factors may lie behind new firm formation. Founders may face actual or threatened 
unemployment.  Entrepreneurship may also be preferred for quality of life reasons.  Many 
employees may achieve job satisfaction only when they have the independence to try out different 
ideas and ways of working.  These may not be possible in another person’s firm.  Desire for 
independence is an important motive for many founders that want to set up a new business.  
Founders or employees of the university may sight an important technological and market 
opportunity.  In Cambridge, which has long had a liberal tradition in the usage of the results of 
science, this motivation might especially be important. 
Table 7a reports the importance of the motives that influenced the founders of new firms.  
The motives scored very important by firms in the sample were: the desire to be independent, to 
make money and to exploit research possibilities.  Technological motives are important but not 
overwhelmingly so.  Table 7b shows that 58% of the firms (29 of 50 firms) were established 
primarily to exploit a technological idea or innovation.  In the majority of the cases this idea   12
originated with the founder.  The university was not an important source of hi-tech firms based on 
technological innovations alone.  
{Table 7a & 7b here} 
The motivations of the founders does not inform us about the particular regional advantages 
that Cambridge possesses that makes firms want to locate there.  Firms in the CBR survey were 
asked an open question about why they located in Cambridge and their responses coded.  An 
overwhelming 86% of the new start-ups (i.e. 38 out of 44 firms) answered that they located in 
Cambridge because they were already living there.  In their study, SQW (1986) report a similarly 
high percentage of firms (73%), which located in the Cambridge area because the founder was 
already living there.  Even more compelling is the observation in SQW (2000) that 20% of start-up 
firms in Cambridge that had relocated from elsewhere had Cambridge founders. 
Keeble et al (1999) also report on the importance of various regional factors in the decision 
of new start-up firms to locate in Cambridge. Table 8 below reproduces their findings; the seven 
most important factors from a list of 19 are reported.  The attractiveness of the local living 
environment for staff and directors and the credibility, reputation and prestige of a Cambridge 
address for hi-tech firms were the factors most frequently cited as important for locating in 
Cambridge.   Local availability of research staff, their quality and also the possibility of informal 
access to innovative people ideas and technologies follow these two main pull factors (emphasis 
mine).  
{Table 8 here} 
Precisely what lies behind this inertia and pull of Cambridge is difficult to pin down.  
Entrepreneurs may want the familiarity of known surroundings and environments in the initial 
risky stages of a business.  This geographical inertia is reportedly an important characteristic of 
new firm formation in other regions of the world.  11 In a situation where new firm formation is   13
frequently due to spin-off activity, this is more likely to be the case, as the newly set-up firm will 
have several formal and informal links with their parent firm that proximity can help to retain.   
Cambridge alumni might value their links with their old university much more than in other 
universities - a factor possibly facilitated by the college structure of Cambridge. The existence of 
an University and the proximity of London may present spouses with more varied job options and 
this may prompt several young couples to want to stay in Cambridge.  Whatever the reason, the 
inertia that kept several dynamic entrepreneurs in Cambridge has also probably contributed to the 
institutional developments in the area, a subject we discuss in more detail in Section4. 
3.2 Changes in the growth strategies pursued by leading firms: the Acorn-ARM story 
A different business model has become common among Cambridge firms in the late 80s and 
90s.  Vertically integrated hi-technology manufacturing has been eschewed in favour of revenues 
from the direct licensing of R&D services and products, often with an investment in overseas 
subsidiaries to promote overseas markets.  The demise of Acorn and the rise of ARM epitomises 
this trend and this section describes this in some detail.   Acorn is an interesting firm to consider 
here for another reason.  It has often been compared to Silicon Valley’s Fairchild.12  Though Acorn 
itself failed it has given rise directly or indirectly to more than thirty start-ups including ARM, just 
as Fairchild gave rise to Intel and other start-ups in Silicon Valley.  The business strategies of ARM 
were different from those of Acorn, and had in fact learnt from the failures of Acorn.   
Acorn Computers was started in 1978 by Hermann Hauser and Chris Curry, and supported 
on a part-time basis by Andy Hopper.13  Its business objectives were broad rather than narrow.  
The company wanted to conceptualise and design microcomputers for home, educational and 
business purposes, local area networks, and the associated hardware and software.  There was an 
early decision to concentrate on developing an in-house excellence in computing research, 
development and design, with the company undertaking no large-scale manufacture and assembly.  
These activities were contracted out to other companies elsewhere in the UK.  However, the   14
company sold a product (the micro-computer) that embodied its research expertise rather than its 
research development and design services. 
After an initial period when the company produced and sold (by mail order) home computer 
kits, the company enjoyed a period of rapid growth because it won an exclusive contract from the 
BBC for supplying microcomputers, which was renewed and followed by a contract with the 
Government of India to introduce computers in schools.  The company entered the business 
computing market by its acquisition and development of IBM compatible products.  It invested in 
complementary hardware and software companies and entered into joint ventures with companies 
like ICL and Racal. 
This strategy of broad diversification into all related areas had advantages and 
disadvantages.  On one hand the company built up an enviable research competence in several 
frontier areas, and created a pool of labour that was able to recognise and encourage the use of 
such research strengths.   On the other hand, Acorn itself became an unwieldy organisation, and 
we can do no better than quote Stan Boland who presided over the ultimate break-up of Acorn 
into ARM and Element 14 in 1999:14 
“Acorn had unreal ideas of how business was done.  It had no real model of how it was going to earn 
money.  It had a larder full of amazing technologies that were not being sold. It was engaged in ‘Martini’ 
marketing.  It would do anything, anytime, any place for anyone.  It had no focus.  The breakthrough for any 
company is when you achieve leadership in your particular space”. 
In a recent interview, Herman Hauser reflected on the several factors that contributed to 
Acorn’s demise.15  He believed that though the BBC Micro had a real lead over its nearest rivals, 
Apple II and Sinclair Spectrum both in terms of speed, price and expansion slots, Acorn did not go 
around the world persuading people to adopt its products as the industry standard.  Instead when it 
received offers to license its technology (as from Commodore to use its Econet networking   15
system) it refused.  At the same time the company had wanted to sell in the US and spent roughly 
$20 million in getting regulatory approval for the BBC Micro’s several devices.  This large cost 
associated with the company’s US operations eventually contributed to its cash-flow problems of 
1983-85 causing Olivetti to bail it out and t ake the majority stake.   Though the company had 
subcontracted most of its manufacture of its machines the contracts were not flexible enough 
causing delays in the launch of new products like Acorn Electron.  Research and development 
spending were too high and often the company appointed senior managers that were more 
interested in technology than in the day-to-day mechanics of running a business.      
Acorn’s demise was probably not all a question of its poor management strategy.  Similar 
stories may be told of other promising firms of the 1980s: Sinclair Research, Amstrad, and Apricot 
all of whom were unable to beat off the competition from the US giants, Apple and IBM.  Saxenian 
(1988) pointed out that Cambridge firms in the mid 80s suffered from deficiencies that were 
common to all new enterprises in Britain, viz. a dearth of markets, managers and manufacturing 
experience.  British manufacturing had shown signs of decline for a long time.  The industrial base 
of the economy had atrophied, with poor standards of living and successive governments tried to 
cash in on the low wages of British labour.  The home market for intermediate high technology 
products was small making the new firms dependent upon exports and marketing strengths in new 
markets. Saxenian(1988) also points out that in several cases UK firms were bought out by their 
overseas distributors.  Lastly, despite a world-class science a poor manufacturing ability that 
required the coupling of science with the technology of production hampered the ability of firms to 
undertake manufacture of science-based products. 
A promising area, which Acorn invested in, was the design and manufacture of RISC 
(reduced instruction set chips), which could be embedded in various products.  Acorn pioneered 
the use of these chips in its Archimedes range of microcomputers, partly because Intel would not 
allow Acorn to license its 286 core chip. Acorn RISC Manufactures was set up in 1983 as a   16
subsidiary of Acorn computers.  Apple wanted to use the ARM in its Newton handheld so ARM 
was spun off as an independent subsidiary  (Advanced RISC Manufactures) with Acorn holding a 
stake in the company and Apple as the other major shareholder.  By 1999, Acorn’s 25% stake in 
ARM was worth more in the stock market than Acorn itself.  Acorn was formally dissolved in 
1999, and Element 14, the non-ARM part of Acorn has recently been bought by Broadcom, an US 
chip design company. 
ARM worked to a business model that showed that it had learnt from several of Acorn’s 
failures.  ARM was specialised in the design of chips.  The company eschewed manufacturing 
altogether.  Instead of subcontracting the manufacturing of chips they chose the licensing route to 
selling their technology.  RISC could be embedded in any technology product, for which the US 
had by far the largest markets.  They tapped external markets by setting up a subsidiary firm in the 
US.    The ARM chip was quickly established as the industry standard.  Over its lifetime the 
company has made and shipped 175 million units.  Its size h owever is modest and it employs 
about 250 employees. 
The important features of the ARM business model were its decision to sell technology 
rather than products and its use of subsidiary operations to gain credibility with foreign customers.  
High technology manufacturing relationships are based on trust in quality and often success in the 
US market and listing on the NASDAQ/EASDAQ stock exchanges has been the way that 
Cambridge firms have chosen to signal this the world.  Listing on the second tier stock exchanges 
also paved the way for the exit of the original founders by the divesting of their equity or through 
acquisition by a bigger company (as happened to Element 14 the other part of Acorn).   
Interestingly the one hi-technology firm that tried to go into providing a service product in 
this period (1997)  - Ionica, with its wireless telephone technology  - failed spectacularly.  Even 
with a product that did not require manufacturing, the lack of a sound marketing strategy caused   17
the collapse of what was most analysts agreed a good idea.  Possibly this failure has added further 
credibility to the ARM business model based on licensing.   
Growth via the licensing route creates several problems for the growth of the licensor. If the 
company grows by developing its own market then R&D costs can become very high, especially if 
it does not find a product that it can embed the technology in.  Often the market for the 
technology may be thin and firms may find it difficult to develop their own independent markets. 
In  this case, a technology based firm’s marketing strategy can be entirely determined, or 
confounded from its initial objectives, by the preferences of the big licensors.  16  The long-term 
growth and viability of licensing firms is difficult when markets for the technologies are not well 
developed and they are also vulnerable to takeovers.  Original entrepreneurs may have little choice 
but to exit the founding firm. 
The ARM model was followed by other hi-technology successes in the 90s, notably 
Autonomy, Zeus,  Vocalis, and Virata.   In 2001, two of these firms, Autonomy and Vocalis are 
reported to be facing problems. Autonomy was one of the more successful firms, which enjoyed 
considerable stock market success in the mid nineties, and managed to grow into a globalised 
technology company employing about 160 people.17 Autonomy’s software can search, retrieve and 
index data from a host of sources including unstructured data such as e-mails.  Its software can be 
embedded in any information search retrieval products of large companies.  Two-thirds of 
Autonomy’s sales come from the US, and recently it has signed over 40 OEM contracts, which will 
allow other firms to embed Autonomy software in their products.   Competition for Autonomy’s 
main product from US companies, Vignette, Inktomi and Broadband is intense.  More damaging is 
the threat that rivals like Microsoft are moving into the company’s main markets.  A product from 
Microsoft’s Cambridge based research centre’s Tahoe project is now out and is reported to look a 
lot like Autonomy but is targeted to small and medium businesses.  Following a poor performance 
at the stock market the board of directors is reported to be in favour of inducting fresh   18
management to be an independent Chairman of the company and pave way for its faster growth.  
Currently Autonomy’s founder Mike Lynch holds both the positions of Chief executive and 
Chairman of the company.     
 Vocalis, a speech recognition company, has posted profit warnings after undertaking a 
heavy second round of R&D spending, which have contributed to losses though their sales have 
been stable.   The sorts of applications that the company expected with its speech recognition 
software have not really taken off.  The judgement of financial analysts on this company is that it 
is still a product waiting for a market. 
3.3  Explaining the slow growth of Cambridge firms 
The shift of the dominant business model away from products to licensing implied a slower 
associated growth of employment.  While this model avoided some of the pitfalls that Acorn faced 
in its growth, it didn’t actually help to overcome the obstacles to that had prevented that growth in 
the first place.  The obstacles to Acorn’s growth came principally from being unable to meet the 
competitive challenge of IBM and Apple and in carving out a large, possibly global market for its 
product.  Licensing as a strategy avoided the problem of having to define markets and aggressively 
compete in them.  To the extent that most new technologies when developed are unique, licensing 
avoids competition.  Firm growth depends upon growing the market for the licensor and avoiding 
imitative competition.  ARM was fortunate that its chip became the industry standard.   But the 
technologies of Autonomy and Vocalis have not had the same scope and so the old problems 
(growing markets, and facing competition) have returned to haunt the stock market successes of 
the 90s. 
Few studies have systematically investigated the causes of the slow growth of firms in the 
Cambridge area.  However the recently concluded SQW (2000) provides some clues.  Based on a 
statistical analysis of the determinants of sales and employment growth across 137 academic and   19
industry start-ups, they find that while age and membership of the chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
sectors, always exercised a positive influence upon growth, somewhat different influences govern 
the growth of sales and employment among start-up firms.18 In addition they found that a greater 
share of R&D expenditures exercised a significant negative effect on growth measured in terms of 
employment, while owner managers negatively influenced sales growth.  The academic or industry 
origin of the start-ups did not however explain their subsequent growth, when factors such as 
industrial sector, age and dominant activity were controlled for.   
These factors are in line with what we have argued so far. The shift to a business model 
based on technology licensing should imply a slower growth of employment but a proportionately 
larger growth of R&D expenditures.  Of t he important start-up sectors, only chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals has an explicitly “product focus” that makes for rapid market growth.  The other 
important start-up sectors such as consultancy, software, telecom are essentially service sectors, 
where market growth is slower and more dependent on a few customers.   
More evidence of this is provided by the CBR survey, where Cambridge firms rated their 
main competitive strengths, reported in Table 9.   Relatively few firms felt competitive advantages 
like price, marketing and R&D – crucial to the success of hi-technology products in mass markets 
- were their important competitive advantages.  Instead the majority of firms scored factors such as 
attention and responsiveness to client needs, technological innovation, specialised expertise, 
established reputation and quality aspects of their product or service as their most important 
competitive strengths.  These are likely to be the important competitive strengths in markets with 
a few prominent customers, which is often the case of niche technology (service) markets.    
{Table 9 here} 
Thus, in Cambridge, there is an incredibly high rate of technology transfer in the form of 
entrepreneurial high technology start-ups but this has been accompanied by somewhat muted   20
growth because of a singular absence of large-scale product markets that would go with that 
technology transfer.  Indeed it may even be a Cambridge spin to an old cliché about Britain: it is 
good at invention but not innovation.    
 
  4.  What sorts of externalities? 
The story we have told about growth in the Cambridge area is one of slow but steady growth 
based on increased levels of entrepreneurship.  Slow growth and low failure rates of firms have 
also meant the absence of any big firms in the economy, whether indigenously grown or pulled into 
the regional economy from outside.  Public policy has been absent.  What has emerged instead is a 
slow self-organisation based on the development of institutions that have sought to foster and 
maintain what the region is perceived to be good at, viz. generating new ideas and commercialising 
them.  This self organising process has in fact encompassed all the main actors in the region - the 
local firms, the local administration, finance and the university.  It has also been the consequence 
of the activities of a small group of academics and entrepreneurs that have stayed in Cambridge for 
a long time.  Not surprisingly then it is also a story that reveals the unimportance of traditional 
agglomeration economies and the importance of other socio-economic mechanisms that share 
information and create opportunities for other firms.   
4.1 The relative unimportance of Marhsallian agglomeration economies 
Traditionally, agglomeration economies promoting growth in clusters are thought to centre 
around the three sources of collective efficiency described by Marshall, viz. backward and forward 
linkages associated with a large local market, advantages derived from a “thick” labour market 
with specialised labour skills and knowledge spillovers.  Firms may specialise more finely in 
intermediate stages of production, because agglomeration can result in a sizeable demand from 
local firms.  The existence of a large number of similar firms may encourage the concentration of   21
supplies of skilled labour.   Information on new technologies and methods may be shared in 
informal meetings between employees of different firms.  Firms may observe the better business 
practices of other firms and learn from this. 
 
Local regional markets have always been relatively unimportant for Cambridge firms. The 
CBR survey estimated that on an average a Cambridge hi-tech firm exported 36% of their output 
in 1995, and that just under half the sample (46% of firms) exported more than 40% of their 
output.  The CBR survey asked firms what proportion of their outputs were sold locally and what 
percentage of their purchases of intermediate goods and services were made locally.  Table 10a & 
10b summarise the results. 
{Tables 10a and 10b here} 
Local markets absorb less than 10% of sales for most of the sample of firms.  Only about 6% 
of all firms surveyed sell more than half of their output locally.  The table also indicates that sales 
to local markets have become marginally more important in 1995 than they were in 1990.  Local 
markets seem more important for purchases of intermediate products and services than they are for 
final goods.  In 1990, 48% of all firms purchased up to half of their materials components and 
services requirements locally.  This proportion rose to 70% in 1995.  Nevertheless all these firms 
still bought an equal amount of their requirements from outside the local economy.  These figures 
suggest that though local markets in sales are not important to most firms, local purchases are 
becoming  more important. 
Labour market advantages did not constitute the most important factor attracting firms to 
locate in the Cambridge area, as we noted in Section 3.   Direct recruitment by firms also suggests 
the low importance of local labour markets.    Less than half the surveyed firms in Cambridge (24 
of 50) reported a conscious policy to recruit locally.  Firms were also asked to report where at least   22
one of their last three research or management staff came from.  The firm could tick different 
boxes, local university, local firms, other UK universities and UK firms, or overseas universities 
and firms.  Table 12 summarises the results obtained.  The responses reveal that Cambridge firms 
mostly recruit from other UK universities and firms, for managerial and research staff.    
{Table 12 here}  
These results on the relatively modest importance of local labour markets should not be 
surprising.  Despite the presence of a large university, the size of the local labour market is small.    
Furthermore, a large proportion of the Cambridge population is migrant.  Overseas students return 
home or move to other locations.  Students from other universities come to Cambridge.  It is also 
relatively easy for Cambridge firms to dip into the neighbouring Greater London labour market, 
which is larger and almost as diversified. 
The evidence on inter-firm links echoes the conclusions about local market linkages.  Table 
11 reports the importance of local and non-local inter-firm links, from the CBR survey.   The types 
of inter-firm links in the local area that were rated as important by most firms were those with 
suppliers/subcontractors and with firms providing services.  The types of inter-firm links outside 
the local economy that were rated as important by Cambridge firms were links with customers, 
followed by suppliers and subcontractors.  It is also worth noting that a larger proportion of firms 
reported non-local than local inter-firm linkages.   Further firms felt that geographical proximity 
was not an important factor for many of the links.   
    Notably inter-firm links did not benefit firms in access to new research findings.  Few 
firms thought that proximity would benefit the firm by more effective or innovative R&D.  Instead 
the main benefits for the Cambridge firms of the links lay in improving the amount and quality of 
information about new products, assuring timely and satisfactory delivery of supplies and the 
greater responsiveness it gave the firm to changing market requirements.  Not surprisingly all of   23
these were categories where firms felt the links would be improved if they were within the region, 
suggesting that some of these benefits presently came from outside the region.19   
 
 
4.2   Other mechanisms creating externalities 
In the remainder of this section, we draw upon the available information on other socio-
economic mechanisms that underlie information sharing and spillovers in the Cambridge area.  For 
convenience we discuss these under the following three headings: 
1.  The university as a source of knowledge transfer 
2.  Information sharing due to the movement of personnel and spin-offs 
3.  Self organising institutions and information sharing generated by a small group 
4.2.1 The university as a source of knowledge transfer 
The University was clearly an important source of knowledge transfer in the early years of 
the Cambridge cluster as SQW showed.   The CBR survey measures several directly observable 
ways in which the University could influence knowledge transfer to hi-tech firms.  One kind of 
direct impact could be that academics could set up hi-technology establishments to commercialise 
technological inventions.  Table 2b tells us one in five spin-offs is still attributable to academics 
previously employed by the university, though only 4% of firms set up to exploit technological 
innovations attributed the source of the innovation to the University.  SQW (2000) estimate the 
proportion of university spin offs to be somewhat higher at 31%.   24
The University may also offer other kinds of free technological advice through various 
formal and informal links that could be important to firms.  42 of the 50 firms surveyed reported 
these links though only 14 of the 42 firms thought that such links were crucial to the success of 
the firm.  Table 13 reports the incidence of different types of interaction between Cambridge firms, 
Cambridge University and other Universities.  It is noteworthy that the links with external 
universities are more important in the aggregate than interactions with Cambridge University for 
seven out of the eight categories considered.   The most frequent forms of interaction with 
Cambridge University were in the form of collaborative projects and University staff acting as 
consultants to the firm.   
{Table 13 here} 
This evidence that points to a low direct impact of the University on businesses in the area.  
However, academic spin-offs tend to be concentrated in science based sectors like software, 
instrumentation engineering, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology, while industry 
spin-offs are concentrated in the engineering based sectors of electronics and audio and R&D 
consultancy.20 Secondly, even though the direct impact of the university is not large, the firms that 
spinout from the University and the researchers that do get employed in local firms, may have a 
disproportionate impact on the cluster as it developed.  Certainly the most important firms in the 
Cambridge area, like Acorn, Sinclair Research and Cambridge Consultants have had university 
roots.   
Focussing on the University alone obscures the role of the powerful and wealthy Cambridge 
colleges that have long seen themselves as producing a fellowship of academics.  Students who 
knew each other as graduates or post-graduates have got together to set up new firms.  The 
interdisciplinary nature of college interaction and the lifelong membership it gives to its graduates 
has been an important factor in keeping the University linked to industry.    As we earlier, former   25
alumni have played an important part in many of the visible industry-university links of recent 
times.    
The independent resources and the relative autonomy of the colleges also mean that they 
have the ability to initiate and support schemes that may not emerge due to consensus. Thus, the 
early experiment of the Science parks were initiated by Trinity College and St. John’s- two of the 
wealthiest colleges in Cambridge, on land that belonged to them.   Though the science park is 
often seen as an indication of the vision of Cambridge University, the university’s role in it was 
minimal.  Indeed it could be argued that all the risks were borne by Trinity College and its 
fellowship.21  
 
4.2.2: Information sharing due to movement of personnel and spin-offs 
Knowledge spillovers and information sharing also take place because of the movement of 
people between firms.  Each person carries information about a firm’s production and technology 
and could potentially utilise it in whichever way she likes.  Firms may also have links with each of 
these former employees, which might facilitate problem solving in an environment within a 
collective of firms.  The CBR survey estimated that 46% of Cambridge firms reported links with 
other firms because of personnel that had moved between firms.  Further, 77% of these firms said 
that these links were important or crucial to the firm’s development.  Table 2c showed that a large 
proportion of firms spun out by former employees continued to retain formal and informal links 
with the parent firm.  Both of these types of links make use of previously existing personal 
relationships that are in turn an important source of information transfer and information sharing.  
  4.2.3   Self organising institutions and information sharing generated by a small group   26
A striking feature of the catalogue of changes in Section 3 is how often a few names crop up 
in the catalogue of institutional developments in the Cambridge area.  Other scholars have noted 
that a small set of key individuals has been important in the many transformations that have made 
for the continuing success of Cambridge.  Thus, Garnsey (1998) draws attention to the role of key 
individuals in the context of defining the main concepts needed for an understanding innovative 
milieu, Lawson (1998) ascribes such structured interactions to be a feature of “regional 
competence”, and Keeble e t al suggest that such key persons and their associated networks of 
relationships are a unique feature of a historical process of regional development.   Less 
admiringly, Saxenian (1988) has also remarked on the old boys’ club that dominates in the 
explanation of the Cambridge successes. 
There appear to be two or three nodes in a network of relationships that spawn both the IT 
and biotechnology sectors.  Chief among the IT node are the names of Maurice Wilkes, and 
Charles Sinclair.  Prof. Maurice Wilkes had been involved with the ENVIAC project and was 
something of a visionary in being able to recognise very early on the potential for software.  He 
was involved in the race to find a solution to the network problem, which Ethernet finally won.  
Nevertheless the “Cambridge ring” solution on which he worked with Andy Hopper for the latter’s 
Ph.D was a close second and the computer laboratory had an outstanding competence in that area.  
Andy Hopper teamed up with Hermann Hauser to found Orbis and Acorn, with the latter being a 
prolific source of other spin-off firms.  Both Hermann Hauser and later John Lee worked for 
Sinclair, and as they set up their own companies with various other people.  Of these Hermann 
Hauser and Andy Hopper had already studied in Cambridge, but Charles Sinclair came to 
Cambridge because Sinclair Research started in partnership with Cambridge Consultants.  A similar 
but smaller network of individuals dominates the biotechnology sector and centres on Chris 
Evans, the founder of Chiroscience.     27
This small group has played an important role in information transfers and in the 
development of the self organising institutions in the Cambridge area.22  Understanding their role in 
information transfers is straightforward.  As we have seen, the same people are entrepreneurs, have 
links with colleges and the university labs and later also advised financial venture capitalists.  The 
role of this group in information transfer from one institution to another is effective in the same 
way as the movement of p ersonnel from one company to another results in a transfer of 
information.  The downsides of this arrangement are two-fold: they could become too closed and 
not let in any outsiders and secondly, the informational transfers between institutions may not 
survive beyond the lifetime of the existing (common) members. 
In a seminal work, Olson (1965) had suggested that small groups are often capable of better 
organisation and investment in collective goods than larger groups.  In later work he extended this 
analysis to encompass the provision of collective goods to a larger group through the activities of a 
small group of “imaginative political entrepreneurs” who have selective incentives to undertake 
this task.  The activities of the small group of Cambridge individuals discussed above resembles 
that of an Olsonian group.  Their role was crucial to the involvement of the University and its 
colleges in the activities of industry in the region.  More recently, the establishment of formal 
partnerships with the university have involved many of the same individuals.  This successful 
interface with the University is a collective good for other hi-tech firms in the region.  It gives the 
Cambridge area an image of being forward looking and entrepreneur- friendly, which we saw is 
important to the continuing establishment of new firms and the growth of the region.23 
5.   In conclusion 
We started this chapter by noting the similarities and differences in outcomes that a 
comparison between Cambridge and Silicon Valley revealed.  In conclusion, we would like to 
suggest some reasons for the observed similarities and the differences.   28
Like Silicon Valley, Cambridge shows a case of successful entrepreneurial activity without 
any enabling government policies.  Given the longer time of its existence as a cluster (relative to 
the other nascent clusters studied in this book) it also shows the slow development of some similar 
local institutions – notably technology venture capital and university-industry linkages.  In both 
Silicon Valley and in Cambridge these developments are the outcome of a self-organising 
behaviour whereby groups of local entrepreneurs and the university recognised their mutual 
advantages for each other.  This strong organic development of working set of institutions and 
institutional relationships that encourage entrepreneurial activity is one of the main successes of 
Cambridge.  
Cambridge however, did not ‘globalise’ to the same degree as Silicon Valley.  There are two 
aspects to this globalisation.  First is the obvious one of firms developing global markets.  While it 
is certainly true that most Cambridge firms export, they have not created global markets that rely 
on their exports alone.  Put differently, the leading firms of the early 80s did not capture global 
markets in any one product/technology space.  There were at least two reasons why it did not 
happen.  First, they were unable to cope with the competition from US firms when after all the 
largest market for their products was in the US.  Second, the lack of good marketing and 
management skills, which seem to be endemic to the growth of British industry.   
The absence of globalisation in this first sense meant that there were no large firms that 
could act as markets for smaller ancilliary firms in the same region.  This is why we find few of the 
traditional agglomeration economies important in the Cambridge case.   This is also the reason why 
Cambridge doesn’t show up as regionally specialised in hi-technology activity in England. 
The second sense in which Cambridge did not globalise is that it did not pull other regions of 
the world to integrate with its production.  This is clearly a function of the first but is still a 
distinct second step.  Immigrants and students did not stay to set up start-ups in Cambridge in the 
way they do in Silicon Valley.  Unlike Silicon Valley, Cambridge remains a quaint English   29
university town, and further more would like to remain so.  A consequence of this lower degree of 
globalisation is in fact the smaller scale of the cluster whether measured by population or by 
regional GDP. 
Of the clusters studied in this book Cambridge is in many respects the closest to Silicon 
Valley.  With no government policies to help, Cambridge tried to manufacture technology products 
based initially on commercialising science from the university laboratories.  It tried to produce 
technology products that were general rather than specific. But in the mid seventies when it started 
Silicon Valley had already got there first.  Perhaps this is why history did not repeat itself.   
Notes: 
                                                                   
1 Estimates are taken from Guardian, 15 April 2000, “Where talent and ideas meet money” by James Meek.  
2 The OECD definition of Knowledge based business adopted in the Huggins study includes all hi-technology 
manufacturing and service sector activities such as IT, computer technology and telecommunications, financial 
and business services, media and broadcasting. 
3 This study adopted a definition of high technology based on Butchart (1987). 
4  The area defined as encompassing the Cambridge Phenomenon has varied in different studies depending upon 
the availability of data.  Thus, it could encompass Cambridge City alone - the area around the university and its 
colleges.   Alternatively, it could comprise the fifteen-mile radius around the university including all of 
Cambridgeshire County but excluding Huntingdon and Peterborough as used in the CBR study and detailed in 
Keeble et al (1999).  Lastly, media reports using CCC data often define Cambridge to mean Cambridgeshire 
county.  Some studies also use the employment service area for Cambridge, which is the labour market for 
Cambridge employers as defined by commuter patterns.  In general this latter definition encompasses all of 
Cambridgeshire County and regions further south and east. 
5 The definition of hi-tech has remained reassuringly consistent in all the work.  It is based on some additions to 
the Butchart (1987) classification and described in Appendix 1. 
6 Their definition of Cambridge region is much vaster than that employed in this paper. 
7 These figures are based on revised data that were generously made available by Jill Tuffnell of the Research 
Group, Cambridgeshire County Council.  Detailed figures are in Table A2.1 in Appendix 2. 
8 Appendix 2 contains the Tables A2.2-3 that charts the sectors of gains and losses in employment.  
9 Estimates from “Cambridge set to take UK venture capital lead” Cambridge Evening News, 2 March 1999. 
10 This information has been collated from different volumes of the Cambridge Reporter. 
11 See for example studies by Galbraith (1985), Oakey and Cooper (1989) and Haug (1991).  
12 See for example ‘From the BBC Micro, little Acorns grew’ by Joia Shillingford, The Guardian, March 8 2001. 
13 This sketch of Acorn Computers is based on several secondary sources and newspaper clippings.  
14 This quote is taken from an article on Stan Boland in the Cambridge Evening News (May 18, 1999) by Jenny 
Chapman titled “Branching out to build on Acorn’s success”. 
15  ‘From the BBC Micro, little Acorns grew’ by Joia Shillingford, The Guardian, March 8 2001. 
16 See for example the Garnsey and Wilkinson (1994) case study of Amartec, a Cambridge silicon chip design 
company. 
17 This report on Autonomy is based on the following newspaper reports: ‘Autonomy is no longer master of its 
destiny’ by Rick Wray, The Industry Standard Europe, March 26,2001 & ‘Trading places’ by Jon Cassy, The 
Guardian June 8, 2001.  
18 The results of the regression analysis are reported in SQW(2000), Tables 12.9 & 12.10. 
19 See Appendix 2 for table on which this inference is based.   30
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
20 See SQW(2000), Table 12.7. 
21 It is rumoured that the Science Park experiment had a plan B- to convert the buildings into a restaurant if the 
Science Park became financially unviable! 
22 I have seen this argument first made in Schwerin, J. (1999) on the Clyde shipbuilding industry in the 19
th 
century.  He notes that a small group of individuals served in multiple institutions that they helped set up and 
acted as the mechanism of information transfer between these institutions and to the extent that this information 
was shared outside the group, these individuals were a source of information externalities. 
23 The causes of the attachment of these people to the Cambridge area are less well understood.  Not all of them 
are in academia nor do they all hold positions in the colleges and universities.   31 
Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Decomposing the gains and losses in establishments 
 
Cambridge City               
Year  New 
firms 
Moved in  Total New  Closures  Moved 
out 
Takeovers  Total lost 
1988-90  31  4  35  26  15  4  47 
1991-92  41  10  51  20  23  2  50 
1993-95  34  7  41  36  20  2  58 
1996-97  50  12  65  26  26  5  59 
1998-99  61  5  75  36  13  6  73 
South Cambridgeshire             
Year  New 
firms 
Moved in  Total New  Closures  Moved 
out 
Takeovers  Total lost 
1988-90  33  9  41  24  14  3  41 
1991-92  48  22  70  22  13    35 
1993-95  28  11  39  28  15  4  47 
1996-97  16  10  27  26  25  5  57 
1998-99  42  22  75  31  14  7  67 
 
Note: 1. Cambridge City and South Cambridgeshire have the most significant proportions of the 
total growth of establishments.  See Figure 1. 
2. “Moved in” category includes firms that have moved in from other regions of 
Cambridgeshire.  
Source: Research Group, CCC.  
 
Table 2a: Original basis of establishment of Cambridge firms 
SQW study, 1984 
N=261 
%  CBR study, 1996 
N=50 
% 
Independent new firm  73  Independent start-up  56 
Relocation of existing enterprise  9  Spin-off  32 
New branch  2  By another firm  12 
New subsidiary  16     




   32 
Table 2b: Firm origins: founder’s previous employment 
“For new start-ups and spin-offs only, where was the chief founder employed immediately previously?” 
 
  Type of firm /organisation         
Location  Self-employed / 
Unemployed 
University  Govt. 




Cambridge area  2  8  1  24  35 
Rest of the UK 
and abroad 
0  2  0  6  8 
Total  2  10  1  30  43 
 
Table 2c: New Cambridge region start-us by former employees and inter-firm links 
 
  Number 
 (Total of 50 firms) 
New start-ups by former employees  24 
Located in Cambridge, of which:  24 
Continuing links with parent firm  18 
Both formal and informal links  15 
Only informal  3 
 
Source for Tables 2b & 2c: Keeble et al (1998) page 234. 
Table 3: Size distribution of hi-tech firms in the Cambridge area, 1998. 
Size Class  
(Employees) 
Cambridge City 
N          (%) 
South Cambs (ex City) 
N          (%) 
0 to 5  117     (33.1)  136       (39) 
6 to 10  72       (20.4)  55         (15.8) 
11 to 24  58      (16.4)  57         (16.3) 
25 to 49  54      (15.3)  44         (12.6) 
50 to 99  24      (6.8)  24          (6.9) 
100 to 199  20      (5.7)  15          (4.3) 
200 to 499  4       (1.1)  14          (4) 
500 +  4        (1.1)  4            (1.1) 
Total firms   353     (100)  349        (100) 
Source: Research group, CCC (1998)   33 
Table 4:Growth Index by sector and period, 1988 -1995 
Year  Biotech  Hardware  Elec. 
Engg 
Instrumentation  Consultancy  Software  R&D  Others  Total 
1988-89  0.37  0.38  0.33  0.28  0.27  0.42  0.19  0.34  0.33 
1990-91  0.44  0.24  0.03  0.16  0.06  0.20  0.11  0.18  0.14 
1992-93  0.26  0.15  0.15  0.17  0.06  0.25  0.22  0.12  0.18 
1994-95  0.05  0.43  0.22  0.19  0.12  0.38  0.33  0.31  0.29 
Source: Gonzales-Benito et al (1997) pages 16-17. 
Notes: 1. Index includes only those establishments that were known to be trading and remaining in the Cambridge TEC region. 
2. The Growth index (GI) for any firm is = (number of employees (t+2)- number of employees (t))/ number of employees (t).   
Growth Index of a sector = n (GI)/N, where N=total number of establishments in the region and n=number of establishments in the sector. 
3. Annual rate of growth (g)=  GI + 1    34 
Table 5: Ratio of closures to new establishments 
Period  Cambridge city  South Cambridgeshire (ex city) 
1988-90  0.84  0.73 
1991-93  0.49  0.46 
1993-95  1.06  1 
1995-97  0.52  1.63 
Source: Computations from Table 1. 
Table 6: Industrial diversity in the Cambridge area  (% of employment), 1984 and 1998 








Chemicals  9  9.7  0.4  18.3 
Specialist mechanical engg  -  3.8  4.8  2.9 
Computer hardware  7  13.3  20.0  7.2 
Electrical and Electronic 
Engg 
33   8.6  8.1  9.0 
Instrument Engg  22  7.2  0.3  13.5 
Aero Engg  -  0.3  0.4  0.2 
Specialist distribution   -  2.5  1.6  3.4 
Specialist retailing  -  0.7  0.9  0.4 
Technical services  -  3.2  4.3  2.0 
Computer Services  8 
1  12.3  17.0  7.8 
Business Services  -  1.1  0.3  1.8 
R&D  7  26.7  33.4  20.4 
Telecomm  -  6.5  7.9  5.3 
Others  -  4.2  0.5  7.7 
Total  100  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Notes: 1. Includes software. 
Source: SQW (1990) for column 2, Research Group, CCC (1998), for columns 3-5. 
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Table 7a: Founder’s motives in setting up the firm 
Motive  % Of firms ranking motives as 
important or very important 
Desire for independence/ be own boss  60 
To make money  52 
Stimulated by research possibilities, urge to innovate  46 
Identified new market opportunity  44 
Threatened or actual unemployment  15 
 
 
Table 7b: Technological innovation and new firm formation 
Was your firm formed primarily to develop or exploit a technological idea or innovation? 
% YES 
58 
What was the source of the innovation? 
Source  % (of what?) 
Firms 
The founder  40 
The university  4 
Existing technology  4 
Founder’s previous employer  6 
Source: CBR survey, unpublished summary   36 
Table 8: Region specific advantages for firm development in the Cambridge region. 
“ How important have the following been for your firm’s development?” 
  % Of all firms 
reporting 4 or 5 
Attractive local living environment for staff/directors  46 
Credibility, reputation and prestige of a Cambridge address  42 
Local availability of research staff  30 
Quality of local research staff  28 
Informal local access to innovative people, ideas and technologies  28 
Availability of appropriate premises  22 
Access to London  20 
Source: Keeble et al (1999); page 325. 
 
Table 9: Competitive advantages of Cambridge firms: frequencies of extreme scores 
Nature of competitive advantage  % Of firms reporting 
extreme scores 
Product/ service quality  86 
Attention and responsiveness to client needs  80 
Specialised expertise  72 
Technological innovation  70 
Established reputation  70 
Product and service design  68 
Flair and creativity  58 
R&D  46 
Marketing and promotion  36 
Price  30 
 
Notes: 1. Firms were asked to rank each source of competitive advantage on a scale 1(not 
important) to 5 (crucially important). 
2. N=50.   37 
Table 10a: Importance of local markets in sales: % of sales to own area by Cambridge firms 








Not applicable  15  30  3  3.3 
Less than 10%  29  58  37  76.7 
11 to 50%  4  8  7  14 
Over 51%  2  4  3  6 
Table 10b: Importance of local markets in purchases: % of purchases in own area by Cambridge firms 








Not applicable  22  44  11  22 
Less than 10%  17  34  22  44 
11 to 50%  7  14  13  26 
Over 51%  4  8  4  8 
 
Table 11: Importance of inter-firm linkages inside and outside the Cambridge area 
Type of link  Within 
Cambridge  
  Outside 
Cambridge  
  Importance 
of proximity 
 
  N  %   N  %  N  % 
Customers  8  21  32  84  6  16 
Suppliers / Sub-contractors  17  45  17  45  15  39 
Firms providing services  12  32  4  11  10  26 
Research Collaborators  4  11  9  24  5  13 
Firms in own line of business  4  11  7  18  3  8 
Others  1  3  0  0  1  3 
Total  25  66  34  89  23  61 
 
Notes:  1. N refers to the number of firms that rated the particular link 4 or 5 on a scale 
1(not important) to 5 (crucially important).   
2.  % is N as a percentage of all firms reporting links.  38 firms in all (of 50) reported 
having any inter-firm links. Source: CBR survey, unpublished summary 
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Table 12: Research and Managerial staff recruitment 
  Research 
Staff 
  Managerial 
staff 
 
  N  %  N  % 
University of Cambridge  7  19  2  6 
Other Cambridge firms /organisations  13  35  12  39 
Other UK universities  10  27  3  10 
Other UK firms/organisations  15  41  18  58 
Overseas universities  4  11  1  3 
Overseas firms/organisations  3  8  7  23 
 





Table 13:  Interaction of Cambridge hi-tech firms with Universities (Number and % of all firms) 




Academics on board  6 (12)  1  (2) 
Collaborative projects with universities  14 (28)  18  (36) 
Collaborative projects with government research 
establishments 
3  (6)  7  (14) 
Part-time secondment by academics  7  (14)  8  (16) 
Research consortia or clubs  5  (10)  8  (16) 
University staff acting as consultants  12  (24)  13  (26) 
Licensing or patenting of university inventions  2  (4)  5  (10) 
Training programmes run by the university  2  (4)  3  (6) 
Total  (includes others)  19 (38)  24 (48) 
   39 
 




























Cambridge City 10714 10960 9996 10689 11265 12944 12699
South Cambridgeshire 11085 11579 11331 12700 13981 14935 16650
Total 23087 24068 22763 24950 27062 29924 31399
1988 1990 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
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Cambridge City 294 328 329 361 367 397 398
South Cambridgeshire 318 365 360 412 409 412 414
East Cambridgeshire 70 86 96 101 105 110 108
Total 710 812 818 909 918 957 959
1988 1990 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
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 Appendix 2: Other tables 
 
Table A2.1: Growth of employment in biotechnology in the Cambridge Area 
Year  Total employment in 
Biotechnology in the 
Cambridge Area 
% of Biotechnology 
employment in all of  
Cambridgeshire county 
1988  4816  80 
1990  4819  80 
1991  4687  80 
1993  5703  82.8 
1995  6128  82.2 
1997  7554  84.6 
1999  8133  89.3 




Table A2.2: Gains and losses in employment in hi-tech industries (1988-98) by industrial sector: 
Cambridge city 
Industrial sector  1988-90  1991-93  1993-95  1995-97 
Chemicals  +17  +3  +4  +26 
Computer 
hardware 
+35  -122  -49  289 
Electrical and 
Electronic Engg 
+30  +319  +66  -114 
Instrument Engg  -451  -51  -89  +2 
Aero Engg        +14 
Specialist 
distribution  
  +52  +25  +27 
Specialist 
retailing 
-17  +13  +6  -8 
Technical 
services 
-17  -29  -27  +72 
Computer 
Services 
-106  +26  +135  +371 
Business Services  +9  +67  -135  +5 
R&D  +553  +222  -32  +570 
Telecomm  -  +162  +689  +530 
Total  +43    +616  +1792 
Source: Research Group, Cambridgeshire County Council, various volumes. 
 Table A2.3: Gains and losses in employment in hi-tech industries (1988-98) by industrial sector: South 
Cambridge (excluding Cambridge city) 
Industrial sector  1988-90  1991-93  1993-95  1995-97 
Chemicals  -298  -55  -94  80 
Specialist 
mechanical engg 
+83  -48  -41  +171 
Computer 
hardware 
+70  +153  -36  -229 
Electrical and 
Electronic Engg 
+221  +105  +142  +137 
Instrument Engg  -82  -97  +158  -101 
Aero Engg    -49  -157  +141 
Specialist 
distribution  
+11  +21  +25  -70 
Technical 
services 
+22  +5  -27  +20 
Computer 
Services 
+300  +352  +135  -68 
Business Services  +18  +2  -135  +52 
R&D  -24  +201  +496  +548 
Telecomm  -  300  -262  +48 
Total  +306  +931  +600  +678 





Table A2.4: The benefits from inter-firm links (N of firms ranking 4 or 5) 
Type of benefit  No. of firms 
reporting 
importance 
Proximity   
increases 
usefulness  
Improving amount of information about new products  20  12 
Improving quality of information about new products  20  13 
Improving access to research findings  9  10 
Assuring a satisfactory quality of supplies  19  14 
Assuring a timely delivery of supplies  15  14 
Greater responsiveness to market requirements  20  6 
More effective or innovative R&D  18  12 
Other  2  2 
Source: CBR survey, unpublished summary. 